Abstract: The Blocking Lemma identi…es a particular blocking pair for each nonstable and individually rational matching that is preferred by some agents of one side of the market to their optimal stable matching. Its interest lies in the fact that it has been an instrumental result to prove key results on matching. For instance, the fact that in the college admissions problem the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers and the strong stability theorem in the marriage model follow directly from the Blocking Lemma. However, it is known that the Blocking Lemma and its consequences do not hold in the general many-to-one matching model in which …rms have substitutable preference relations. We show that the Blocking Lemma holds for the many-to-one matching model in which …rms'preference relations are, in addition to substitutable, quota q separable. We also show that the Blocking
Introduction
Two-sided, many-to-one matching models study assignment problems where a …nite set of agents can be divided into two disjoint subsets: the set of institutions (called …rms) and the set of individuals (called workers). Each …rm has a preference relation on all subsets of workers and each worker has a preference relation on the set of …rms plus the prospect of remaining unmatched. A preference pro…le is a list of preference relations, one for each agent. A matching assigns each …rm with a subset of workers (possibly empty) in such a way that each worker can work for at most one …rm. Given a preference pro…le a matching is called stable if all agents have acceptable partners (individual rationality) and there is no unmatched worker-…rm pair who both would prefer to be matched to each other rather than staying with their current partners (pair-wise blocking).
The "college admissions model with substitutable preferences"is the name given by Roth and Sotomayor (1990) to the most general many-to-one model with ordinal preferences in which stable matchings exist. Each …rm is restricted to have a substitutable preference relation on all subsets of workers; namely, each …rm continues to want to employ a worker even if other workers become unavailable (Kelso and Crawford (1982) were the …rst to use this property in a more general model with money). For each substitutable preference pro…le the deferred-acceptance algorithms produce either the …rms-optimal stable matching or the workers-optimal stable matching, depending on whether the …rms or the workers make the o¤ers. The …rms (workers)-optimal stable matching is unanimously considered by all …rms (respectively, workers) to be the best matching among all stable matchings.
A more speci…c many-to-one model, called the "college admissions problem" by Gale and Shapley (1962) , supposes that …rms have a maximum number of positions to be …lled (their quota), and that each …rm, given its ranking of individual workers, orders subsets of workers in a responsive manner; namely, for any two subsets that di¤er in only one worker a …rm prefers the subset containing the most-preferred worker. 1 In this model the Blocking Lemma says the following. Fix a responsive preference pro…le. Suppose that the set of workers that strictly prefer an individually rational matching to the workersoptimal stable matching is nonempty. Then, we can always …nd a …rm and a worker with the following properties: (a) the …rm and the worker block the individually rational matching, (b) the …rm was hiring another worker who strictly prefers the individually rational matching to the workers-optimal stable matching, and (c) the worker (member of the blocking pair) considers the workers-optimal stable matching to be at least as good as the individually rational matching. The interest of the Blocking Lemma lies in the fact that it is an instrumental result to prove key results on matching. For instance, the fact that in the college admissions problem the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers (Dubins and Freedman, 1981) 2 and the strong stability theorem in the marriage model (Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor, 1987) follow directly from the Blocking Lemma. The …rst result says that if in centralized markets (like entry-level professional labor markets or the admission of students to colleges) a mechanism selects for each preference pro…le its corresponding workers-optimal stable matching then, no group of workers can never bene…t by reporting untruthfully their preference relations. This is an important property and it becomes critical if the market has to be redesigned, in which case the declared preference pro…le conveys very valuable information. The second result says that every non-stable matching is either non-individually rational or we can identify a blocking pair (a …rm and a worker) and another stable matching such that both members of the blocking pair weakly prefer to the original one. It is known that the Blocking Lemma does not hold for the many-to-one matching model with substitutable preference pro…les. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we consider a weaker condition than responsiveness, called quota q separability, that together with substitutability implies that the Blocking Lemma holds for all these preference pro…les 1 Observe that the marriage model (i.e., the one-to-one matching model) is a particular instance of the "college admissions problem" when all …rms have quota one. 2 To be precise, they show it for the marriage model, but their result can be extended to the college admissions problem. Some results concerning stability in the college admissions problem are immediate consequences of the fact that they hold for the marriage model. Each college is split into as many pieces as positions it has, so transforming the original many-to-one model into a one-to-one model. Responsiveness allows then the translation of stability from one model to another. See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a complete description of this procedure as well as for its applications. Observe that this reduction is possible only if preferences are responsive.
(Theorem 1). 3 A …rm is said to have a separable preference relation over all subsets of workers if its partition between acceptable and unacceptable workers has the property that only adding acceptable workers makes any given subset of workers a better one. However, in many applications such as entry-level professional labor markets, separability alone does not seem very reasonable because …rms usually have fewer openings (their quota) than the number of "good" workers looking for a job. In these cases it seems reasonable to restrict the preference relations of …rms in such a way that the separability condition operates only up to their quota, considering unacceptable all subsets with higher cardinality. Moreover, while responsiveness seems the relevant property for extending an ordered list of individual students to a preference relation on all subsets of students, it is too restrictive, though, to capture some degree of complementarity among workers, which can be very natural in other settings. The quota q separability condition permits greater ‡exibility in going from orders on individuals to orders on subsets. For instance, candidates for a job can be grouped together by areas of specialization. A …rm with quota two may consider as the best subset of workers not the set consisting of the …rst two candidates on the individual ranking (which may have both the same specialization) but rather the subset composed of the …rst and fourth candidates in the individual ranking (i.e., the …rst in each area of specialization). Second, we show (in Theorem 2) that the Blocking Lemma holds on a subset of substitutable preference pro…les (not necessarily quota q separable) if and only if the workersoptimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers on this subset of pro…les. This means that, in contrast with what the literature has considered so far, the Blocking Lemma is more fundamental than just a key step to prove general results like group strategy-proofness of the workers-optimal stable mechanism for the workers. Observe that our former result (Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo, 2004) showing that the workersoptimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers on the set of substitutable and quota q separable preference pro…les was proved assuming that the Blocking Lemma 3 We have already showed that if …rms have substitutable and quota q separable preference pro…les then, (a) the set of unmatched agents is the same in all stable matchings (Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo, 2000), (b) the set of stable matchings has a lattice structure with two natural binary operations (Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo, 2001 ), (c) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers, relative to the set of individually rational matchings (Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo, 2004) , and (d) the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers (Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo, 2004) . This last result is proven assuming that the Blocking Lemma holds for all subsitutable and quota q separable preference pro…les; here, we are providing a proof that this is indeed the case.
was true on the set of all these pro…les. Hence, Theorem 2 and our former result does not imply that the Blocking Lemma holds on the set of all substitutable and quota q separable preference pro…les. Theorem 1 states that this is indeed the case.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, which closely follows Martinez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2004), we present the preliminary notation and de…nitions. In Sections 3 we present the Blocking Lemma and state, in Theorem 1, that it holds on the set of all substitutable and q separable preference pro…les. In Section 4 we state and prove the equivalence, on any subset of substitutable preference pro…les (not necessarily quota q separable), between the Blocking Lemma and group strategy-proofness of the workersoptimal stable mechanism for the workers. In Section 5 we conclude with an example of a substitutable and quota q separable preference pro…le for which the symmetric Blocking Lemma for the …rms does not hold. We collect all proofs in two Appendices at the end of the paper.
Preliminaries
There are two disjoint sets of agents, the set of n …rms F = ff 1 ; :::; f n g and the set of m workers W = fw 1 ; :::; w m g. Generic elements of both sets will be denoted, respectively, by f , f , and e f , and by w, w, and e w. Each worker w 2 W has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation P (w) over F [ f;g, and each …rm f 2 F has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation P (f ) over 2 W . Preference pro…les are (n + m)-tuples of preference relations and they are represented by P = (P (f 1 ) ; :::; P (f n ) ; P (w 1 ) ; :::; P (w m )). Given a preference relation of a …rm P (f ) the subsets of workers preferred to the empty set by f are called acceptable. Similarly, given a preference relation of a worker P (w) the …rms preferred by w to the empty set are called acceptable. Therefore, we are allowing for the possibility that …rm f may prefer not to hire any worker rather than to hire unacceptable subsets of workers and that worker w may prefer to remain unemployed rather than to work for an unacceptable …rm. To express preference relations in a concise manner, and since only acceptable partners will matter, we write acceptable partners in the order of decreasing preference. For instance, P (f i ) : w 1 w 3 ; w 2 ; w 1 ; ;
A market is a triple (F; W; P ), where F is a set of …rms, W is a set of workers, and P is a preference pro…le. Given a market (F; W; P ) the assignment problem consists of matching workers with …rms, keeping the bilateral nature of their relationship and allowing for the possibility that both, …rms and workers, may remain unmatched. Formally, De…nition 1 A matching is a mapping from the set F [ W into the set of all subsets of F [ W such that for all w 2 W and f 2 F : (a) Either j (w)j = 1 and (w) F or else (w) = ;:
(c) (w) = ff g if and only if w 2 (f ) :
Condition (a) says that a worker can either be matched to at most one …rm or remain unmatched. Condition (b) says that a …rm can either hire a subset of workers or be unmatched. Finally, condition (c) states the bilateral nature of a matching in the sense that …rm f hires worker w if and only if worker w works for …rm f . We say that w and f are unmatched in a matching if (w) = ; and (f ) = ;. Otherwise, they are matched. A matching is said to be one-to-one if …rms can hire at most one worker; namely, condition (b) in De…nition 1 is replaced by: Either j (f )j = 1 and (f ) W or else (f ) = ;. The model in which all matchings are one-to-one is also known in the literature as the marriage model. The model in which all matchings are many-to-one (i.e., they satisfy De…nition 1) and …rms have responsive preferences 4 is also known in the literature as the college admissions problem (Gale and Shapley, 1962) . To represent matchings concisely we will follow the widespread notation where, for instance, given F = ff 1 ; f 2 ; f 3 g and W = fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 g,
represents the matching where …rm f 1 is matched to workers w 3 and w 4 , …rm f 2 is matched to worker w 1 , and …rm f 3 and worker w 2 are unmatched. Given a matching and two subsets
4 Roughly, for any two subsets of workers that di¤er in only one worker a …rm prefers the subset containing the most-preferred worker. See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a precise and formal de…nition of responsive preferences as well as for a masterful and illuminating analysis of these models and an exhaustive bibliography.
Let P be a preference pro…le. Given a set of workers S W , let Ch (S; P (f )) denote …rm f 's most-preferred subset of S according to its preference relation P (f ). Generically we will refer to this set as the choice set.
A matching is blocked by worker w if ;P (w) (w). A matching is blocked by …rm f if (f ) 6 = Ch ( (f ) ; P (f )). We say that a matching is individually rational if it is not blocked by any individual agent. We will denote by IR (P ) the set of individually rational matchings. A matching is blocked by a …rm-worker pair (f; w) if w = 2 (f ), w 2 Ch ( (f ) [ fwg ; P (f )), and f P (w) (w).
De…nition 2 A matching is stable if it is not blocked by any individual agent nor any …rm-worker pair.
Given a preference pro…le P , denote the set of stable matchings by S (P ). It is easy to construct examples of preference pro…les with the property that the set of stable matchings is empty. These examples share the feature that at least one …rm regards a subset of workers as being complements. This is the reason why the literature has focused on the restriction where workers are regarded as substitutes (Kelso and Crawford (1982) were the …rst to introduce the notion of substitutable preferences).
De…nition 3 A …rm f 's preference relation P (f ) satis…es substitutability if for any set S containing workers w and w 0 (w 6 = w 0 ), if w 2 Ch (S; P (f )) then w 2 Ch (Sn fw 0 g ; P (f )).
A preference pro…le P is substitutable if for each …rm f , the preference relation P (f ) satis…es substitutability. Blair (1988) shows that the choice set of substitutable preference relations have the following property.
Remark 1 Let P (f ) be a substitutable preference relation and assume A and B are two subsets of workers. Then,
Kelso and Crawford (1982) shows that (in a more general model with money) if all …rms have substitutable preference relations then: (1) the set of stable matchings is nonempty, and (2) …rms unanimously agree that a stable matching F is the best stable matching. Roth (1984) extends these results and shows that if all …rms have substitutable preference relations then: (3) workers unanimously agree that a stable matching W is the best stable matching, 5 and (4) the optimal stable matching for one side is the worst stable matching for the other side. That is, S (P ) 6 = ; and for all 2 S (P ) we have that
The deferred-acceptance algorithm, originally de…ned by Gale and Shapley (1962) for the marriage model, produces either F or W depending on who makes the o¤ers. At any step k of the algorithm in which …rms make o¤ers, a …rm proposes itself to the choice set of the set of workers that have not already rejected it during the previous steps, while a worker accepts the o¤er of the best …rm among the set of current o¤ers plus the one made by the …rm provisionally matched in the previous step (if any). The algorithm stops at step K at which all o¤ers are accepted; the (provisional) matching then becomes de…nite and it is the …rms-optimal stable matching F . Symmetrically, at any step k of the algorithm in which workers make o¤ers, a worker proposes himself to the best …rm among the set of …rms that have not already rejected him during the previous steps, while a …rm accepts the choice set of the set of current o¤ers plus that of the workers provisionally matched in the previous step (if any). The algorithm stops at step K at which all o¤ers are accepted; the (provisional) matching then becomes de…nite and it is the workers-optimal stable matching W .
Let P be a substitutable preference pro…le. In the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 we will use properties of the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make o¤ers. For this reason we present the following notation. For all f 2 F; the set
is the set of workers that make an o¤er to f along the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make o¤ers and whose outcome is matching W : For any step 1 k < K, let O k (f ) denote the set of workers that make an o¤er to f at k or at earlier steps. Obviously,
5 The matchings F and W are called, respectively, the …rms-optimal stable matching and the workersoptimal stable matching. We are following the convention of extending preference relations from the original sets (2 W for the …rms and F [ f;g for the workers) to the set of matchings. However, we now have to consider weak orderings since the matchings and 0 may associate to an agent the same partner. These orderings will be denoted by R (f ) and R (w). For instance, to say that all …rms prefer F to any stable means that for every f 2 F we have that F R (f ) for all stable (that is, either F (f ) = (f ) or else
Moreover, for all f 2 F;
Example 1 below (taken from Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2004)) illustrates the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make o¤ers.
Example 1 Let F = ff 1 ; f 2 ; f 3 g and W = fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 g be the two sets of agents with the substitutable preference pro…le P , where P (f 1 ) : w 1 w 2 ; w 2 ; w 1 ; w 4 ; ;, P (f 2 ) : w 3 ; w 2 w 4 ; w 1 w 2 ; w 4 ; w 1 ; w 2 ; ;, P (f 3 ) : w 4 ; w 1 ; w 3 ; ;,
The following table summarizes the 6 steps of the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make o¤ers with the corresponding o¤er sets, choice sets, and rejected workers for each of the three …rms (we omit the brackets in the sets and write, for each f i , O k i and Ch Table 1 The algorithm terminates at step 6 (i.e., K = 6), when no worker is rejected, and the provisional matching then becomes de…nite. For all f 2 F; O(f ) = O 6 (f ) and
! is the workers-optimal stable matching.
A …rm f has a separable preference relation if the division between good workers (fwgP (f ) ;) and bad workers (;P (f ) fwg) guides the ordering of subsets in the sense that adding a good worker leads to a better set, while adding a bad worker leads to a worse set. 6 Formally, De…nition 4 A …rm f 's preference relation P (f ) satis…es separability if for all S W and w = 2 S we have that (S [ fwg) P (f )S if and only if fwgP (f );:
A preference pro…le P is separable if for each …rm f , the preference relation P (f ) satis…es separability.
Remark 2 All separable preference relations are substitutable. To see this, just note that if P (f ) is separable then, for every S W , Ch (S; P (f )) = fw 2 S j fwgP (f ) ;g. Moreover, the preference relation P (f ) : w 1 ; w 1 w 2 ; w 2 ; ;
shows that not all substitutable preference relations are separable.
Sönmez (1996) shows that if …rms have separable preference relations then there exists a unique stable matching. A simple way to construct this unique stable matching is as follows: for each w 2 W , let (w) be the maximal element, according to P (w), on the set of …rms for which w is an acceptable worker; i.e., ff 2 F j fwgP (f ) ;g. The stability of follows directly from separability of …rms'preferences.
Here, we will assume that each …rm f has, in addition to a substitutable and separable preference relation, a maximum number of positions to be …lled: its quota q f . This limitation may arise from, for example, technological, legal, or budgetary reasons. Since we are interested in stable matchings we introduce this restriction by incorporating it into the preference relation of the …rm. The college admissions problem with responsive preference pro…les (Gale and Shapley, 1962) incorporates the quota restriction of each …rm by imposing a limit on the number of workers that a …rm may admit. However, from the point of view of stability, this is equivalent to supposing that all sets of workers with cardinality larger than the quota are unacceptable for the …rm. Therefore, even if the number of good workers for …rm f is larger than its quota q f , all sets of workers with cardinality strictly larger than q f will be unacceptable. Formally, 7 We will denote by q = (q f ) f 2F the list of quotas and we will say that a preference pro…le P is quota q separable if each P (f ) is quota q f separable. In principle we may have …rms with di¤erent quotas. The case where all …rms have quota 1 separable preference relations is equivalent, from the point of view of the set of stable matchings, to the marriage model. Hence, our set-up includes the marriage model as a particular case. In general, and given a list of quotas q, the sets of separable and quota q separable preference relations are unrelated. Moreover, quota q separability does not imply substitutability and the set of responsive preference relations is a strict subset of the set of quota q f separable and substitutable preference relations. There are quota q separable preference pro…les for which the set of stable matchings is empty (see Example 1 in Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2004)).
The Blocking Lemma
The Blocking Lemma is a statement relative to a substitutable preference pro…le. Given a substitutable preference pro…le P , the Blocking Lemma states that if the set of workers that strictly prefer an individually rational matching to W is nonempty then, we can 7 For the purpose of studying the set of stable matchings, condition (b) in this de…nition could be replaced by the following condition: jCh (S; P (f ))j q f for all S such that jSj > q f . We choose condition (b) since it is simpler. Sönmez (1996) uses an alternative approach which consists of deleting condition (b) in the de…nition but then requiring in the de…nition of a matching that j (f )j q f for all f 2 F . Notice that in his approach the set of separable preference relations of …rm f is quota q f separable for all q f . always …nd a blocking pair (f; w) of with the property that f was hiring at a worker strictly preferring to W and w considers W being at least as good as . Formally, De…nition 6 (The Blocking Lemma) Let P be a substitutable preference pro…le and let 2 IR (P ). Denote by W 0 = fw 2 W j (w) P (w) W (w)g the set of workers who strictly prefer to W : Assume W 0 is nonempty. We say that the Blocking Lemma holds at P if there exist f 2 (W 0 ) and w 2 W nW 0 such that the pair (f; w) blocks :
Let e P be a subset of substitutable preference pro…les. We say that the Blocking Lemma holds on e P if it holds at all P 2 e P. Gale and Sotomayor (1985) proved the Blocking Lemma for the marriage model (i.e., the Blocking Lemma holds on the set of all pro…les of preference relations in which each agent only orders the set of individual agents of the other side of the market plus the prospect of remaining unmatched). Using the decomposition described in Footnote 2, it is easy to see that the Blocking Lemma also holds for the college admission problem (i.e., on the set of all responsive preference pro…les). In Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2004) we exhibit an example (Example 1 above used to illustrate the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make o¤ers) of a substitutable preference pro…le P for which the Blocking Lemma does not hold at P . For completeness, we reproduce below why the Blocking Lemma does not hold at P . Example 1 (Continued) Consider F , W; and the substitutable preference pro…le P of Example 1. As we have already found, the workers-optimal stable matching is
The individually rational matching
has the property that for all w 2 W , (w)P (w) W (w). Hence, W nW 0 = ; since W 0 = fw 2 W j (w)P (w) W (w)g = W: Therefore, we can not …nd w 2 W nW 0 and f 2 (W 0 )
such that (f; w) blocks : Thus, the conclusion of the Blocking Lemma does not hold at P .
Theorem 1
The Blocking Lemma holds on the set of all substitutable and quota q separable preference pro…les.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix 1.
Blocking Lemma and Group Strategy-proofness
Many real matching markets are centralized. A centralized matching market consists of a clearinghouse that, after asking each agent to report a preference relation, proposes a matching. This de…nes a mechanism. A mechanism is stable if it proposes, for each reported preference pro…le, a stable matching. 8 Formally, let P be a domain of preference pro…les and let M be the set of all matchings. A mechanism h : P ! M maps each preference pro…le P 2 P to a matching h (P ) 2 M. Therefore, h (P ) (f ) is the set of workers assigned to f and h (P ) (w) is the …rm assigned to w (if any) at preference pro…le P 2 P by mechanism h. A mechanism h : P ! M is stable if for all P 2 P, h(P ) 2 S(P ). Let S be the set of substitutable preference relations of any …rm on 2 W and let T be the set of all preference relations of any worker on F [ f;g. The set of all substitutable preference pro…les can be written as the set P = S F T W . Let e S be a subset of substitutable preference relations for any …rm and let e P = e S F T W . 9 To emphasize the role of a subset of workers c W we will write the preference pro…le P 2 e P as (P c W ; P c W ). Therefore, given P 2 e P; c W W , and P to report some preference relation. A mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers if for all subsets of workers they can never obtain better partners by revealing their preference relations untruthfully. Formally, De…nition 7 A mechanism h : e P ! M is group strategy-proof for the workers if for all preference pro…les P 2 e P, all subsets of workers c W W; and all reports P
for some w 2 c W .
We say that h W : e P ! M is the workers-optimal stable mechanism if it always selects the workers-optimal stable matching; that is, for all P 2 e P, h W (P ) is the workers-optimal 8 The National Resident Matching Program is a very well-know example of a centralized entry-level professional labor market in the U.S.A. that uses a stable mechanism to match yearly around 20,000 medical students to hospital programs to undertake their medical internship (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a description an analysis of this market). See Roth and Xing (1994) for a discussion of many centralized matching markets. 9 Observe that the domain of preference relations of the workers is unrestricted while the domain of preference relations of the …rms may be any subset of substitutable preference relations.
stable matching relative to P . Theorem 2 below states that the Blocking Lemma and group strategy-proofness of the workers-optimal stable mechanism for the workers are equivalent on any subset of substitutable preference pro…les e P = e S F T W .
Theorem 2
The Blocking Lemma holds on e P if and only if the workers-optimal stable mechanism h W : e P ! M is group strategy-proof for the workers.
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix 2 at the end of the paper.
Concluding Remark
One may ask whether or not the symmetric Blocking Lemma for the …rms also holds on the same set of preference pro…les for which the Blocking Lemma holds for the workers. The answer is negative because it does not even hold on the smaller subset of responsive preference pro…les. Example 2 (taken from Roth (1984a)) contains a substitutable and quota q separable preference pro…le P for which the Blocking Lemma for the …rms does not hold at P .
Example 2 Let F = ff 1 ; f 2 ; f 3 g and W = fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 g be the two sets of agents with the (2; 1; 1) separable and substitutable preference pro…le P , 10 where P (f 1 ) : w 1 w 2 ; w 1 w 3 ; w 2 w 3 ; w 1 w 4 ; w 2 w 4 ; w 3 w 4 ; w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ; ;, P (f 2 ) : w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ; ;, P (f 3 ) : w 3 ; w 1 ; w 2 ; w 4 ; ;, P (w 1 ) : f 3 ; f 1 ; f 2 ; ;, P (w 2 ) : f 2 ; f 1 ; f 3 ; ;, P (w 3 ) : f 1 ; f 3 ; f 2 ; ;,
The …rms-optimal stable matching is
10 Observe that P is indeed a responsive preference pro…le.
Consider the individually rational matching
The set of …rms that prefer to F is F 0 ff 2 F j (f )P (f ) F (f )g = ff 1 ; f 3 g. Thus, F nF 0 = ff 2 g: However, f 2 can only block together with w 1 ; but (w 1 ) = f 1 P (w 1 )f 2 :
Hence, the Blocking Lemma for the …rms does not hold at P: Note that this pro…le is used in Roth (1984a) to show that, in the college admissions problem, the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which …rms make o¤ers is not strategy-proof for the …rms.
Appendix 1: Proof of Theorem 1
Through out all this appendix we will assume that P is a substitutable and quota q separable preference pro…le and that 2 IR (P ). The set of workers who strictly prefer to W will be denoted by W 0 = fw 2 W j (w) P (w) W (w)g and we will assume that W 0 is nonempty.
In the proof of the Blocking Lemma for the marriage model (i.e., q f = 1 for all f 2 F ), the …rm f that, together with a worker w, blocks is matched at because f 2 (W 0 ); that is, f …lls its quota at (i.e., j (f )j = q f = 1). In the proof of the Blocking Lemma for the many-to-one model, the …rm f that, together with a worker w, blocks is also matched at because f 2 (W 0 ), but now it will be necessary to consider separately the case in which f does not …ll its quota at (i.e., j (f )j < q f ) from the case in which f …lls its quota at (i.e., j (f )j = q f ). Proposition 1 considers the case where j (f )j < q f : For the case where j (f )j = q f the proof of the Blocking Lemma will also be decomposed, as in the marriage model, into two propositions depending on whether or not (W 0 ) = W (W 0 ) holds (Proposition 2 for the simple case where they are di¤erent and Proposition 3 for the more involved case where they are equal). However, before proving these three propositions, we prove a series of three lemmata that will be used in the proof of all three propositions since they hold regardless of whether or not (W 0 ) = W (W 0 ) and whether or not all …rms in (W 0 ) …ll their quota at .
Proof. Assume otherwise and let
Moreover, 2 IR (P ), quota q f 0 separability of P (f 0 ), and
which is a contradiction.
Lemma 2 Assume there exist f 2 (W 0 ) and
Then w 2 W nW 0 , and (f; w) blocks :
we have that either w 2 W 0 and w 2 (f )n W (f ) or w 2 W nW 0 and w 2 W (f )n (f ).
Assume w 2 W 0 and w 2 (f )n W (f ). Then,
Moreover,
; which together with (2) imply that (f; w) blocks W . Therefore, we can assume that w 2 W nW 0 and w 2 W (f )n (f ). Then,
Moreover, w 2 Ch( (f ) [ W (f ); P (f )) implies, by substitutability of P (f ), that w 2 Ch( (f ) [ fwg; P (f )); which together with (3) imply that (f; w) blocks :
By Remark 1 and condition (1), Lemma 2 can also be stated as follows.
there exist e f 2 (W 0 ) and w 2 W nW 0 such that ( e f ; w) blocks :
Proof. It follows from Claims 1 and 2 below.
there exists w 2 W nW 0 such that (f; w) blocks :
To see this, …rst observe that, by Lemma 1, j W (f )j = q f . Moreover,
By hypothesis and (4),
By Lemma 2, (f; w) blocks :
Hence, by the hypothesis that there exists
This e f satis…es the hypothesis of Claim 1, and hence, there exists w 2 W nW 0 such that ( e f ; w) blocks .
and w 2 W nW 0 such that ( e f ; w) blocks :
We consider two cases:
such that ( e f ; w) blocks :
11 Note that f 2 (W 0 ) and j (f )j < 1 are incompatible in the marriage model.
Moreover, by quota q f -separability of P (f ) and the individual rationality of W , w is a good worker for f . Hence, j (f )j < q f implies
Conditions (5) and (6) say that f 2 (W 0 ) and w 2 W nW 0 are such that (f; w) blocks .
there exist f 2 (W 0 ) and w 2 W nW 0 such that (f; w) blocks .
Proof. Consider the following two cases:
Hence, by Lemma 3, the conclusion of Proposition 2 holds.
Finally, Proposition 3 below states that the conclusion of the Blocking Lemma holds for all remaining cases where
and, for all f 2 (W 0 ), the following three
Then, there exist f 2 (W 0 ) and w 2 W nW 0 such that (f ; w) blocks .
We want to show that this inclusion holds with equality. We will do it by
showing that the two sets have the same cardinality. By (a), quota q separability of P (f ), and
Hence,
Claim 3 For all w 2 W 0 ; W (w) 6 = ;:
Because all workers can work at most for one …rm and since (b) holds,
If there would exist w 2 W 0 such that W (w) = ; then, jW
which would contradict (8).
For each step 1 k K of the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make o¤ers, de…ne the set T k as the set of pairs of …rms and workers in (W 0 ) and W 0 , respectively, with the property that w is acceptable for f; w makes an o¤er to f at k or at earlier steps, and f rejects w at step k: Namely,
Set T 0 = ;: Since for all 1 < k K and all f 2 F; O
of P (f ) implies that, for all 1 k K, T k 1 T k . Furthermore, there exists 1 k K such that T k 6 = ;: To see that, note that: (i) each w 2 W 0 makes an o¤er to f = (w) at (some) step k of the algorithm (w 2 O k (f )), (ii) w is acceptable for f (w 2 Ch(fwg; P (f )),
Therefore, step k M where
is well-de…ned. By Claim 3, T K nT K 1 = ;: Hence, and since T 0 = ;; 1 k M < K:
Proof of Claim 4 By de…nition of
By de…nition of k M and (1), for all f 2 (W 0 ) and all k k M ;
W (w 1 ) 6 = ;: Hence, there exists f 2 2 (W 0 ) such that
Proof of Claim 5. By (11) and the fact that
was rejected by …rm f 1 :
Proof of Claim 6. By (7) and f 2 2 (W 0 ) ;
Let
holds trivially: By individual rationality of and quota q f 2 separability of P (f 2 ),
By Claim 5,
To see that (14) holds, observe that, by (a), (14) holds. Thus, by (13) , the statement of Claim 6 holds.
(15) By Claim 6, such e w exists. We will show that e w = 2 W 0 : Assume otherwise; i.e., e w 2 W 0 :
Hence, e w 2 W 0 :
By (15) 
Hence, by substitutability of P (f 2 );
By e w 2 Ch(O
Moreover, by e w = 2 W 0 ,
and by (16) , ( e w) 6 = f 2 . Hence, by (18) and (19),
Thus, since f 2 2 (W 0 ) and e w = 2 W 0 , (16), (17) and (20) say that the conclusion of the Blocking Lemma holds.
7 Appendix 2: Proof of Theorem 2 =)) Assume that the Blocking Lemma holds on e P = e S F T W and suppose, to get a contradiction, that h W : e P ! M is not strategy-proof for the workers; namely, there exist P 2 e P; a nonempty subset of workers c W ; and P
We …rst show that
Moreover, for all w 2 c W ,
Since all matchings 2 S (P ) have the property that W R (w) for all w 2 W and there exists at least one w 2 c W with
W (w)P (w) W (w)g and the Blocking Lemma holds at P 2 e P, there exists a pair (f ; w), where f 2 (W 0 ) and w 2 W nW 0 such that (f ; w) blocks
Assume that h W : e P ! M is group strategy-proof for the workers and suppose, to get a contradiction, that the Blocking Lemma does not hold on e P; namely, there exist P 2 e P and an individually rational matching such that
For all w 0 2 W 0 , consider the preference relation P 0 (w) 2 T , where
Since h W is group strategy-proof for the workers, there exists w 0 2 W 0 such that
and W = h W (P ) be the corresponding workers-optimal stable matchings in S (P 0 W 0 ; P W 0 ) and S (P ), respectively. Let
W (w)g the set of worker that make an o¤er to f along the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make o¤ers applied to P and P 0 , respectively. Let O k P (f ) denote the set of all workers that make an o¤er to f along the deferred acceptance algorithm applied to P at k or at earlier steps. Then, 
and
By the de…nition of O P (f 1 ); (23) implies that
By (22),
If w 1 2 W 0 then, by de…nition of P 0 (w 1 ); f 1 = (w 1 ): Hence, f 1 = (w 1 )P (w 1 ) W (w 1 );
contradicting (24). Then, w 1 = 2 W 0 : Hence, P 0 (w 1 ) = P (w 1 ): Thus, (25) can be written as 
Proof of Claim 8.
Hence, by assumption,
and, by substitutability of P (f 0 ), Hence, w 1 makes an o¤er to f 0 along the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make o¤ers applied to P 0 (i.e., w 1 2 O P 0 (f 0 )). Hence, by de…nition of P 0 (w 1 ), w 1 2 (f 0 ); a contradiction. Thus, w 1 = 2 W 0 . By substitutability of P (f 0 ),
Since w 1 = 2 W 0 ; W (w 1 )R(w 1 ) (w 1 ): By (28),
By assumption, (w 1 ) 6 = f 0 . Thus, (29) implies f 0 P (w 1 ) (w 1 ):
Conditions (27) and (30) imply that (f 0 ; w 1 ) blocks ; and f 0 = (W 0 ) and w 1 = 2 W 0 .
Hence, the Blocking Lemma holds at P .
